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Abstract 
Most  countries  in  Sub-Saharan  Africa  have  embarked  on  Integrated  Water Resources 
Management.  As  part  of these  reforms  in  the  water sector,  many  governments  are 
considering and others have already implemented the legal tool ofwater  rights allocation and 
have linked the same to water  tariffs. This paper analyzes formal and factual payment-linked 
water right systems in  the agrarian economies of Sub-Saharan Africa.  The  formal water 
management tools, as formulated in the water policies and laws are analyze and compared 
with the early experiences of implerrientation and impacts on the ground,  in particular in· 
Tanzania.  The  paper further examines whether in reality the original objectives of  the water 
rights and water tariffs are attained or not; the potentials ofthe water rights and water tariffs, 
and the present and possible pitfalls ofthe same.  The paper  also identifies the problems that 
are encountered in the administration and the enforcement of  these tools.  Finally the paper 
draws the  generic conclusions,  which also draw upon lessons learnt in Australia and the 
USA,  highlight the conditions in SUb-Saharan Africa under which the managerial aims of 
payment-related water  right systems can be reached, but  also the conditions under  which the 
tool creates new problems without solving existing problems, and  thus should be abandoned. 
Key words; Sub Saharan Africa,  Tanzania,  Water Stressed Basins,  Water rights,  water 
tariffs, and agrarian economies 
Introduction 
Most countries  in  the  Sub Saharan Africa  have  been  reviewing  water policies,  laws  and 
legislations and management strategies in  quest to implement Integrated Water Resource 
Management (IWRM) in the past two decades. The diminishing quantities of water, coupled 
with  increased  water uses  due to  increased  population  and improved  technologies  have 
further necessitated the review mechanisms. Tanzania,  South Africa and Zimbabwe have 
been in the forefront of these changes. This paper focuses on such changes with a specific 
case of water rights in  the Rufiji Basin in  Tanzania. The paper argues that although water 
rights have been operational since the colonial era in Tanzania and that although both are 
tied together now,  water charges were introduced later with a different purpose altogether. 
The  paper starts  by  describing the  background  of the  study area  and  the  methodology 
employed by the study, and then focuses on the inherent management challenges of water 
rights with a specific attention on the potentials and pitfalls of the same. Finally, the paper 
identifies the management gap and proposes a way forward. 
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1 Background of  the Study Area 
Water allocation and management in the sub Saharan Africa has been for long determined 
by the local customary arrangements that existed among the local communities in  specific 
river basins.  Although  formal  water management  and  legislation  was later introduced  by 
colonial rules through various Water Ordinances in the early 1900s, the practical day-to-day 
water management in the grassroots is still widely influenced by the latter. 
In Tanzania specifically, seeking to favour the white settlers, the colonial minority introduced 
centralized  water  authority  and  water  use  registration.  By  1948,  the  British  colonial 
government had vested absolute water authority in the colonial rulers
3
• Several ordinances 
were transposed  from  England  and/or India to intensify the same.  After independence in 
1961, the new government continued the principle, declaring that 'a/l water in Tanganyika is 
vested in the United Republic' under the Water Utilization (Control and Regulation) Act 1974, 
section 8. The Act echoed the Water Ordinance of 1959, by  governors and then ministers 
were to delegate water control authority to various officers and water bodies. 
The framework for integrated water resources management is laid out in the Water Utilisation 
(Control  and  Regulation)  Act  42  of  1974,  as  amended  by  Act  10  of 1981.  The  Water 
Utilization Act (Control and  Regulation) remains the supreme law on water management in 
Tanzania. Both criminal and  civil laws guarantee the sanctity of water management organs 
under this Act. Other pieces of legislation touching upon water matters in Tanzania include 
the Waterworks Ordinance,  Cap.128  and  Urban  Supply Water Act,  1981. There are also 
many institutions interested in water:'  However, in Tanzania, institutions that are involved in 
water management are loosely connected and lack basic coordination (DANIDAlWorld Bank, 
1995). They are sectoral and fragmented with no coordination (Water Policy Draft 2002). 
Descriptions of  the study area 
The Rufiji basin  is the largest of the nine river basins in  Tanzania, draining a total area of 
about 177,000 km
2  (URT,  1995). It is made of several river systems, the largest and  most 
important of which  is  the  Great Ruaha  River  (GRR)  system.  The  Great  Ruaha  River is 
draining an  area of about 68,000 km
2
•  The Great Ruaha River originates from a number of 
large and small streams at the northern slopes of the Poroto and Kipengere mountains in the 
Southern Highlands between Mbeya and  lringa.  It flows to the Usangu plain where several 
other rivers flowing from the highlands join it; namely Mbarali, Kimani and Chimala whereas 
the  small  ones  include  Umrobo,  Mkoji,  Lunwa,  Mlomboji,  Ipatagwa,  Mambi  and  Mswiswi 
rivers. 
During the rainy season, the Great Ruaha River spills onto the Usangu plains, forming the 
Usangu wetlands (Western-Utengule and  Eastern) and feeding a perennial swamp (/hefu) 
within the Eastern wetland. It then flows through Ng'iriama (an exit to the Eastern Wetland) 
on to the Ruaha National Park providing the main water source to the park and to the Mtera 
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2 dam, which is the main electrical generating source in Tanzania (accounting for 56% of the 
runoff to Mtera dam). As it flows down, it is joined by Little Ruaha River before being joined 
by the Kisigo River. It then passes through the Mtera reservoir, before flowing westward to 
the Kidatu reservoir, being joined on the way by the Lukosi and Yovi rivers. From the Kidatu 
reservoir  then  it  flows  into  Kilombero  Plains  before joining  the  Rufiji  River  Oust  above 
Steigler's gorge), collecting en route the Kitete and Sanje rivers. 
The  Great  Ruaha  River  serves  many  uses  and  users  as  it flows,  including  irrigation, 
hydropower generation, livestock, domestic uses, fisheries and aquatic flora and fauna. 
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Figure  1:  Map  of Tanzania  showing  Rufiji  Basin with its river networks and other 
basins 
Irrigation is the major activity and largest water user,  mainly during the dry season.  Other 
water-related livelihoods include fishIng,  livestock keeping and brick making. Problem arises 
in the dry season where conflicts and disputes over access to water become common. As 
much water is diverted to the fields for  irrigation and brick making, the reduced river flows fail 
to supply full requirements downstream.  This has brought a lot of  environmental concems 
after  the massive mortality and stresses to aquatic ecosystem. Downstream ofthe RNP  there 
are two hydro powerstations (Mtera and  Kidatu) depending much on the basin for  their  water 
for  power  generation, contributing about 50% ofthe Tanzania national grid. 
Methodology of  the study 
This study was conducted under the DFID funded project, RaiSing Irrigation Productivity and 
Releasing  Water for Intersectoral  Needs (RIPARWtN) in  the  Mkoji  sub-catchment of the 
Great Ruaha River Catchment in the Rufiji basin between July 2002 and October 2004. For 
the sake of clarity. the catchment was divided into three hydro-geo agricultural zones, namely 
3 the  upper catchment,  middle areas and  the lower plains.  In  each zone,  two  villages were 
selected,  making  a total of six villages. Three Participatory Rural Appraisals (PRAs) were 
conducted,  one  in  each zone gather preliminary information on  the subject matter. Semi­
structured interviews were then done with identified respondents followed by a Focus Group 
Discussion in  each zone where ten key informants and eight district officials from the two 
districts of the Mkoji Sub catchment were involved. The respondents were invited in the role­
play River Basin Gamel workshop. The findings were then analysed  and  feed  back to the 
respondents through another River Basin Game workshop. 
Managing the Business: Water Rights 
Although popular and widely outspoken as a water management tool, managing water rights 
is  quite  a challenge  in  Sub  Saharan Africa.  Unlike  elsewhere  in  the world,  the  region  is 
characterised  by  many  poor smallholder who  are  widely  scattered  and  use  very  poorly 
developed (local structures to draw water). In such a set up, it is not easy to ascertain what 
quantity of water is exactly drawn, or to predict the quantities in future seasons. In the Mkoji 
Sub catchment where this study was done, of the 120 irrigation off-takes that were observed 
up to 71(58%) were local temporary structures popularly known as 'dindilo'. 
The  study  also  found  out  that  the  procedure  for  application  of  water  rights  is  long, 
complicated, time consuming and bureaucratic and is too much wanting for poor water users 
to attain. The applicant is required to fill in an application form (5 copies) and submit them to 
the Water Officer (or to the Regional Water Engineer,  in  cases where there is not a Basin 
Water Board).  A letter from  the Village Government where the abstraction will  take place 
must  accompany  the form.  If it is a large  project,  the  applicant is  required  to submit an 
Environmental  Impact  Assessment  (EtA)  report  to  the  Water  Board.  The  Water Officer 
registers the application and  prepares an  official notice setting out the particulars which is 
published in the Government Official Gazette, served upon affected persons, and displayed 
at the office of the district in  which the right will be exercised. After receipt of any further 
reports required  by the Water Officer, the application is submitted to the Water Board for 
deliberation and decision. This unduly long procedure does not sufficiently encourage local 
water users to apply for water rights. For example, in the six villages studies, hardly a quarter 
(25% and  17%) of two villages knew the procedure.  In the remaining four villages,  nobody 
knew the procedure! 
Potentials of  Water Rights 
In Tanzania, categories of use are classified in an order of priority as a guide only, and not as 
a directive. In  granting a water right, the use of water for domestic supply is given the first 
priority6, and then the use for livestock, irrigation, and hydropower generation, industrial and 
mining  purposes.  Environmental water requirements are  paramounted  higher,  only next to 
domestic needs.  This is an  important turning  point in that the national water management 
frameworks recognises, at least theoretically, the human and livelihood needs for water and 
those of the environment for a better sustainable ecosystems.  Furthermore, taxation and 
charging for water introduces a realization of value for water resources. The National Water 
Policy  (2002) expresses the same expectations of taxation. 
"Economic instruments include water  pricing, charges, penalties and incentives to be used to 
stimulate marketing mechanism,  and serve as an incentive to conserve water,  and reduce 
5  These reports may include some or aU of the Hydrological report from  the Regional  Water engineer, 
Agricultural report,  Natural resources report, Administrative Repolt from District Commissioner and District 
Executive Director 
6  Any person  having lawful access  to  a  source  may abstract  water for domestic purposes  withott 
obtaining a water rigft 
4 pollution of water sources
n  (URT 2002) ...... ..udecision-making in  the public sector,  private 
sector and in civil society on the use of  water should reflect the scarcity value of  water, water 
pricing,  cost sharing,  and other incentives  for promoting the  rational use  of wate~ (URT 
2002)........ 'Economically,  trading of water rights,  application of economic incentives and 
pricing for water use,  shall be gradually built into the  management system as a means or 
strategy for demand management and water conservation' (URT 2002). 
The  practical  implementation  of this  argument (,enhancement of water fees  and  pollution 
charges as  an  incentive for water conservation  and  pollution  control,  and  as a source of 
funds for water regulation activities, catchment conservation, and water resources monitoring' 
(World Bank 1996 Annex A» would be via the water officers. 
'The basin water offices will be mandated to collect revenue such as fees and charges and to 
be  used  to  meet  the  cost  of regulatory  functions  and  financing  of water  resources 
assessment services.  The  basin  water offices and basin  water boards will be  required to 
account for the  use  of these  funds,  which  will also  be  audited annually by Government 
auditors as is occurring with other  public funds' (World Bank 1996 Annex A). 
Volume-based  rate  setting  may seem  objective and  fair.  However,  in  the absence of any 
objective basis to assess the volumes allocated and, thus, to set volume-based rates, Water 
Officers can  only rely  on  their subjective judgement.  Even  nominal differences by  ranking 
structures  according  to  their  sizes  appeared  difficult.  In  the  Mkoji  sub-catchment,  for 
example, the volumes and  related fees for the larger structure Inyala A were initially set at 
lower rates than for a nearby smaller structure of Inyala B.  The water users complained. In 
this case,  the water officer accepted the complaints and  changed the fees the other way 
around. In other cases there is enormous confusion among small- and medium-scale users in 
the Upper Ruaha about the amounts to be paid (Sokile, 2003; Gaussen 2003). 
Water Officers  at the  various  levels  have  been  mandated  to  collect  and  transfer public 
money.  However,  accountability procedures in  carrying  out this task are weak. The Water 
Office responsible write receipts for taxes received, but an administrative system that inserts 
fee payments into the computer excel sheet of registered water users is still absent. Further, 
when  submitting  the  collected  funds from  the sub-catchment office to  the  basin  office in 
Iringa, the accountant notes the amounts in the books. A public auditor is supposed to check 
the various amounts, but the auditor's willingness to check the money contributions to basin 
offices  is  limited.  The  public  auditor's  key  interest  is  the  publicly  allocated  funding  from 
Government. Without a sound transparent system to administer and justify money flows, the 
basin and catchment level officers render themselves vulnerable to accusations of corruption. 
Pitfalls of Water Rights 
I 
Conceptually, the whole notion of water rights is alien and prejudiced in origin, purpose and 
practice.  Procedurally,  the  water  rights  system  is  wanting.  The  application  process  is 
unnecessarily long, bureaucratic and time consuming; a typical kind  of discouragement for 
weak applicants. As it is now, the procedure is not pro-poor nor does it seek to empower the 
grassroots water resource users to acquire a water right. 
The  existing water rights are complex to operate.  Some water rights were issued under the 
repealed  Water  Ordinance,  1959  which  had different  provision  for payment  altogether. 
Although  the  Water Ordinance  1959  was  repealed  by the  Water Utilization  (Control and 
Regulation) Act No. 42 of  1974.Some water right holders are dead and new users have taken 
over.  Other water rights have been abandoned, either by migration, or  death of  the bearers, 
or  by changing river regime, depth and flow; yet some water uses have changed, far from the 
Original purpose of  the application. Some water rights have been illegally transferred to new 
holders or sublet; some water right holders have changed their practical abstraction, mostly 
5 increased the quantities of  water they use. Furthermore, Water rights are season-blind. They 
are issued irrespective of the season despite major differences in  availability and value of 
water in  the  wet and dry seasons.  This  may has exacerbated concerns over water use 
between May and December when there is scarcity 
Water rights: A tool for collecting water taxes? 
One of the  recent  paradigms  in  managing  water rights  is  their strong  linkage  to water 
charges. This new water rights and taxation system was promulgated in 1994 and refined in 
1997 and  2002,  every time without public consultation. The system  requires everyone in 
Tanzania using even a  little bit of water for production to register to obtain a  'water right 
certificate' from the Ministry of Water and  Livestock Development. Registration costs TSh 
35,000 (about US $ 35.00) and the annual economic water fee of at least TSh 40,000 (US $ 
40.00) per year. 
Introduction of water fees and the subsequent tier of the same to water rights is seemingly an 
un  realised  objective.  Introduction of water fees was conceivably based on some four key 
assumptions: a}.  'Payment for water would deter overuse and hence avoid waste of water' 
(World  Bank  1996).  This was expected  to  mitigate this real  or perceived  growing  water 
scarcity.  b}.'Payment  for water,  coupled  with  water rights  would  reduce  water related 
conflicts'.  c}.  'Payment  for water would generate  income  to  sustain  water management 
initiatives'. Gauging the objectives, our findings revealed the converse: Paying for water has 
distorted the local customary arrangements for water allocation and management and has 
sufficiently influenced a change of behaviour among water users, ironically for worse for the 
water sector!  Three window periods can be identified as a consequence of water fees, as 
shown in table 1 below: 
Table 1: Effects ofWater Charging to Water Management Initiative in Inyala village 
Period  Practice  Effect 
----------~~------------------- Pre- water fees  Mainly customary  Status quo 
(before 1997) 
Water  fees  Farmers  contributed  for Water right  Area under irrigation expanded 
introduction  application fees and water user fees,  by 40%, farmers felt more value 
(1997 -2000)  in  total  amounting  to  TSH  240,  of water,  more  water conflicts 
000.00  (90,000.00  and  150,000.00  erupted, land values rent values 
for  Inyala  A  and  B  respectively),  increased in the irrigated areas 
distributed to  individual farmer,  each  from  TSH.  20,000.00  per acre 
paid an average of  4000.00- another  before water fees to 40,000.00 
sum was to sustain the local office.  per acre 
Farmers formulated  water roasters  Conflicts  reduced  within  the 
Water  fees  for rationing water; Farmers agreed  schemes,  but  intensified 
operational  to  restrict  area  under  crop  between  the  schemes.  The 
(2000-4)  cultivation to 0.25 acre and agreed  upstream  abstractors  would 
on  various  by-laws to  enforce the  take all water from the river to 
roasters  justify their fees. 
The other side of the drawback of water fees has been that the revenues accrued from water 
are far low below targeted amount, because water user charges are very low compared to 
investment  and  introducing  higher charges  would  be  challenged  by exacerbating  rural 
poverty and may trigger a lot of political concerns. Actual collections are below average. Only 
some 39% pay the levies, majority of who are domestic water users and large-scale private 
companies.  Large scale state irrigation schemes and individuals are the leading culprits in 
not paying for water. The government agency responsible for collection of fees apparently 
spends more time and resource to collect less fees- thus costing both the government and 
the agency! 
6 t. 
Inherently, the payment mechanism has some weaknesses. Billing mechanism is confusing 
water users since they do not know whether the prices are estimated for the wet season or 
for the dry season. As such those who use water only in dry or wet season questions the 
legitimacy  of paying  for wet or dry season  respectively.  Since volumetric water pricing  is 
based on the water rights, there is always a temptation to raise more income through issuing 
more water rights.  As  a consequence,  some  rivers would  be  more abstracted than other, 
depending on the awareness and willingness of the water users to apply for water rights. For 
example, the Mlowo River in Moji Sub catchment has 19 water rights amounting to more than 
4.1 cumecs against the peak average river flow of hardly 2.1 cumecs. 
The  present  water  rights  systems,  as  widely  advocated  for,  are  now  being  used  as  a 
registration, taxation and water management tool. While initially the water rights were meant 
for water uses registration and allocation, their use as a taxation tool is quite recent 
With the newly introduced purpose of taxation,  the entire purpose of the water rights has 
been distorted, with even the fonner fl!fl1ctions being· counter-produced. 
Water rights:  A Management Failure? 
Operationally, water rights system fails to fully meet their objectives in the Rufiji basin. Water 
rights system fails as a registration tool. Establishing and maintaining water users register is 
a  challenge  due  to  fluctuating  numbers  hundreds  of small-scale  users.  Even  with  lists, 
establishing  location of users andl or estimates of volume  of water used  is  more difficult, 
especially without the bureaucracies, maps, and measuring devices required. As such, there 
are  only partially  aavailable  data  for water uses  users names and  site estimates without 
correct  volumes  abstracted.  Any  attempt  to  qualify  and  maintain  this  infonnation  is 
undoubtedly expensive. 
(a) 	 Water rights system also fails as a taxation tool in that unlike the popular opinion 
(World  Bank,  1991),  taxation  cannot recover costs of water management nor 
deter water use. This is unlikely because blanket charging rarely act as deterrent 
to resource use, if any, aggravates the use (Sokile & van Koppen, 2003; GWP, 
2000). In the Mkoji sub catchment, experience has shown that fanners expanded 
their field and water related conflicts increased with the introduction of water 
charges.  Furthermore,  with a  weak registration  tool renders the system even 
weaker as a  taxation tool,  resulting in both inequity and ineffiCiency.  Lack of 
coherent accountability system for monies collected, if not checked, may result 
into a 'corruption by design' phenomenon. 
Conclusion and Recommendation 
Managing water through water rights is still a challenge for Tanzania. The water fee, seen as 
'water taxation',  antagonizes  people  in  the  Upper  Ruaha  Sub-Catchment,  because  they 
suddenly have to pay the government without seeing any improved water or support service. 
Issues of legitimacy for payment,  equity  in  allocation,  cost-recovery mechanisms and the 
general  collection,  maintenance  and  upkeep  of  water  rights  systems  infonnation  is  still 
wanting.  Unlike the  expectations of the  government through the World Bank support. the 
introduction  of water charges  and  fees  has not sufficiently improved  water management 
imperatives but rather, has complicated the matter. 
The paper recommends that registration of water users should be done include only large­
scale users who are easily reachable and accessible. The records should be kept in ledgers 
and electronically with sufficiently detailed infonnation possible, which indicate, among other 
things,  grids and  volumes  abstracted  and  should  be  reviewed  at least  on  annual  basis. 
Similarly, payment for water should be strictly tied to the volumetric abstraction and should 
7 involve only large scale users who would be encouraged to settle water bills through bankers 
drafts and cheques to minimise costs of follow up. 
Finally, the whole idea of water rights should be revisited to allow a more flexible system, a 
sort of water use licence that would allow periodic review and adjustments. 
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